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Stragegies for Cross-Examining Expert witnesses : 
Social Scientists' Encounters with Attorneys 
In the School Desegregation Cases 
An important part of expert testimony in courtroom litigation involves 
cross-examination by opposing attorney(s). For attorneys, this is a critical 
part of the adversarial process and a necessary mechanism for ensuring that the 
judge is provided with truthful and relevant testimony. For social scientists, 
this mechanism may constitute a challenge to their preferred process of seeking 
truth and often is the most stressful part of providing testimony. In this paper 
we examine several strategies of expert cross-examination attorneys used in a 
sample of the school desegregation cases. School desegregation is by no means 
the only litigation involving social scientists as expert witnesses; scholars 
have been active in cases involving employment discrimination, environmental 
impact, products' liahility, medical liahility and insurance, mental health 
assessments, etc. The school desegregation cases represent a relatively unique 
set because the issues (and sometimes the attorneys and experts) are rather 
similar across locales, and we can rather easily identify several outstanding 
strategies of cross-examination. 
The findings reported here come from data collected in a larger study of 
interactions among social scientists, attorneys and judges involved in the school 
desegregation cases of the 1970's (Chesler, Sanders and Kalmuss, 1981). Two data 
sources are used in this paper: 1) interviews with 83 scientific experts who 
testified in, and 60 attorneys who tried, a sample of 17 school desegregation 
cases in Federal District Courts during the 1970's; and 2) over 2500 pages of 
court transcripts of cross-examiniation in a sub-sample of 6 of these cases. 
Excerpts from our interviews with these actors, and edited versions of 
interactions occurring in the court transcripts, are presented as evidence. 1 
Purposes of Cross-Examination 
Different experiences with cross-examination, and different views of the 
purposes of cross-examination, are tied undoubtedly to different conceptions of 
the nature of truth, and to different ways of attaining truth in the courtroom. 
Some actors see the cross-examination of expert testimony as an effort to get at 
transcendent truth, truth that exists above party or individual convictions and 
affiliations. This approach is supported hy legal scholars who believe an 
important part of the attorney's role on cross-examination is to promote this 
truth. For instance, in ohjecting to the use of what he saw as weak or 
inadequate scientific evidence in the early desegregation cases, Cahn indicated 
that opposing lawyers have a' critical duty. 
... it is a lawyer's duty to conduct thorough and searching 
cross-examinations of adversary experts. In this way, he serves more 
than the interests of his own client. Vigorous cross-examination 
serves the larger social interest (a) by exposing fallacies in the 
expert evidence and (h) hy deterring experts from, making assertions 
that will not hold water. If the prospect ,of skilled cross-examination 
can deter some laymen from committing perjury, it may also deter some 
experts from passing off wishes as facts (1956:193). 
Several scholars we interviewed report agreement with the view that the 
basic purpose of cross-examination is to clarify issues and to determine the 
"truth". As one expert notes: 
The function of the cross-examination is to sharpen what's been said, 
to make sure the witness says what is in fact true and consistent with 
reality. It's done to ensure validity, and it's terribly important. 
It is not used to discredit the witness: the attorney who tries that is 
in trouble. 
One lawyer reflects a position close to Cahn's in the following statement: 
My cross-examination of an expert witness is to hold them to the area 
of their expertise and to prevent their trying to spread the aura of 
legitimacy from an area which they might he a legitimate and 
unchallengable expert into an area where they are just somehody else 
talking. 
Despite this view, most scientific experts see attorneys' goals as "winning" 
the case, and the purpose of cross-examination as a means of negating one truth 
in order for another to persevere. They often feel it is a partisan attempt by 
opposing attorneys to undermine their testimony. Moreover, the major tactics 
they see being utilized are attacks on their credibility and attempts -.to 
discredit them. Consider these reflections by scientists who testified as 
experts : 
The purpose of the cross-examination is to destroy the credibility of 
the witness. 
The lawyers are trying to make you look had and less competent than you 
are. They will try to make you contradict yourself, and will try to 
discredit you personally if they cannot discredit your social science 
data or testimony. 
Attorneys writing in leeal hooks and journals often agree that a primary purpose 
of cross-examination is to gain admissions favorahle to their side of the case, 
even if that does involve discrediting the witness (Haddad, 1979). Most 
attorneys we interviewed agree that the purpose of cross-examination is to aid 
their effort to argue or demonstrate that their own or their witnesses' version 
of reality is more accurate. In this pursuit many admit that they do try to 
destroy the credentials of opposing witnesses or to discover weaknesses or holes 
in their arguments that might harm their credihility. For instance: 
I guess you would say that a good cross-examiner had to destroy the 
credihility of a witness. 
It was easy to cross-examine him and to affect his credibility because 
he had a tendency to make a lot of statements that he didn't really 
have any knowledge about. That they were really opinions that he held 
without any basis in fact or in articles that he had read or whatever. 
This partisan view of cross-examination, and indeed the entire courtroom 
process, creates particular stress for experts, especially for those anticipating 
attacks hy opposing attorneys. In fact, experts express far more discomfort and 
conflict related to cross-examination than to any other aspect of witnessing. 
Over three-fourths-of the scholars who reported conflict in their roles as expert 
witnesses indicated that most of this conflict occurred during cross-examination 
. (Chesler, Sanders and Kalmuss, 1981). One root of this stress and role conflict 
is the loss of control experts may experience regarding their suhstantive 
presentation, as well as their emotional stahility or integrity. The following 
statement hy-one expert captures some of these feelings: 
It is a little mini-war that the expert-witness plays with the lawyer. 
And once the lawyer makes you look like an ass, you say, "Boy, next 
time I get on the witness stand, that lawyer's going to look like an 
ass ." 
Part of the reason cross-examination represents such a hattleground is the 
organizational structure and procedure of the courtroom. The adversarial process 
for testifying and attaining legal truth, and the adversarial structure of the 
courtroom, and testimony, estahlish an arena wherein different versions of truth 
or reality are presented and tested against one another. As representatives of 
their party's interests, attorneys are lead agents in arguing for one version of 
reality .and against another version. h%en experts enter to present or support 
one of these versions they enter the hasic hattleground. 
Another reason scholars in particular may find cross-examination stressful 
is that many enter it with naivete ahout the ground rules, with concern ahout 
protecting their own neutral stance as scholars and with a comroitment to the 
certainty of their testimony (Kalmuss, 1981). Challenges to their testimony that 
are well within the norms of the courtroom may feel like highly personal attacks. 
Under such circumstances, scholars may try to defend themselves against 
intrusion, potential emharassment and role confusion. 
Attorneys' Strategies of Cross-Examination 
The strategies of cross-examination, and indeed any courtroom examination, 
are the subject of a body of "ho'w to" hooks written by successful trial attorneys 
(~ailey and Rothhlatt, 1977; Jones, 1975; Keeton, 1975; McElheney, 1974; Morrill, 
1971), and often presented in journals oriented to practicing attorneys (e.g., 
American Journal of Trial Advocacy, Litigation, Trial, The Practical Lawyer). 
Much of this advice is summarized in O'Barr (1982). These general suggestions to 
be used with discretion, include: a) he well prepared and knowledgeable about 
prohahle testimony; h) maintain tight control over witnesses during 
cross-examination; c) do not reveal surprise even when an answer is. totally 
unexpected; and d) he courteous and avoid interrupting a witness whenever 
possible. Beyond such general suggestions there are more particular strategies 
attorneys may pursue in the attempt to undermine opposing experts on 
cross-examination. Our review of court transcripts reveals at least 5 such 
strategies used hy attorneys in the school desegregation cases. 
Challenges to the witness' academic credibility 
Challenges to the witness' knowledge of local issues 
Implications of special interest or personal bias 
Searches for admission of the legitimacy of opposing views 
Exposures of contradictions or errors in testimony 
Other language has been used to describe some of these strategies. For instance, 
quite close to the "search for admission of the legitimacy of opposing views" is 
the "learned treatise" strategy described by Haddad (1979) and Poythress (1980). 
Here the attorney confronts the witness with a renowned article opposed to his 
view and asks if the witness is familiar with it. If the expert denies knowledge 
his qualifications may be cast into doubt; if he indicates knowledge he must 
argue against the learned treatise lest it (and its fame) cast doubt on his 
. substantive testimony. 
In this section we illustrate these five strategies, and provide several 
examples of the whereby attorneys "lay a trap" for a witness and try to 
throw him or her off stride in order to spring a sudden challenge. 2 
Challenges to the Witness' Academic Credibility 
Some attorneys argue it is fruitless to challenge directly a scholar's 
academic credentials. After all, if a person is admitted as an expert, has the 
requisite degrees and publications, etc., that might not he very productive. 
However, Kornblum suggests academic standing and credentials should be 
questioned, if only to establish their limits (1974). As one attorney indicates 
in an interview: 
I don' t challenge their credentials. I don't need to do that. . .You 
just want to make clear what it is that forms the hasis of their 
testimony. It's important for the judge to know whether this person is 
brought forward as an expert who knows what the hell he's talking 
ahout. 
Of course the attorney who attempts to discredit a witness personally must 
be careful. In the early desegregation trials, for instance, cross-examination 
of plaintiff witnesses often was particularly disparaging, sometimes to the 
tactical disadvantage of opposing counsel. As Cahn indicated in his review of 
Isadore Chein's testimony and cross-examination: 
In the Virginia trial, the defense appeared particularly inept. Far 
from caring to concentrate on the doll test and its scientific 
validity, the lawyer for the defendants was preoccupied with other 
lines of cross-examination. He had a different set of values to 
display. Why concern himself with dissecting the experts' logic and 
the correctness of their inferences? Instead questions were asked 
which would convey disparaging insinuations about a professor's 
parents, his ancestral religion, the source of his surname, the 
pigmentation of his skin, or the place of his birth. . . .As any 
healthy-minded person reads the Virginia trial record, it is possible 
not to contrast the altruism and soher dignity of the scientists with 
the hehavior of the defendant's counsel, who by his manner of espousing 
the old order, exposed its cruelty a-nd bigotry (1955:165). 
It is rare to discover such crass cross-examination in the 1970's. But this 
history is on record. Its existence, as well as critiques like Cahn's, helped 
establish some limits to the direct attacks on scientists' personal credibility 
in these cases. 
One way attorneys attempt to challenge a witness' credentials directly is to 
raise questions about their experience and knowledge of the field. For instance, 
in one cross-examination the attorney challenges an educational scientist's 
limited experience as a school superintendent. 
Counsel: You yourself have not heen the superintendent of any large 
city - 
Witness: That is correct. 
Counsel: According to the newspaper you were the superintendent at some 
district in the state at some time. 
Witness: They were two separate districts. 
Counsel: How big a district was the first? 
Witness: Oh, small. Enrollment at the time was under a thousand, hut I 
can't rememher the exact numher. 
Counsel: Any hlacks? 
Witness: No. 
Counsel: Is that the extent of your experience as an administrative 
head of any school district? 
Witness: Yes. 
Other challenges to a witness' credentials may include examination of prior 
testimony or scholarship, particularly if the scholar has testified in other 
cases. Several attorneys indicate that it is easier to cross-examine witnesses 
who have testified many times hefore. After all, their statements are on the 
record; it is easier to predict what they will say, to prepare to challenge it 
and perhaps even to find an emharassing admission or error in pages of prior 
testimony. As one attorney notes in this regard; 
He has never testified before, which you can understand is a benefit in 
that he didn't have a million pages of cross-examination to pull out 
the mistakes that he had made before. 
In addition to challenges focusing on the witness' own experience and 
research, attacks on a more indirect sort can he made on the source material a 
scholar cites. In the following excerpt the attorney implies that sources not 
appearing in a refereed journal may not he quite acceptable, legitimate or fully 
scientific. 
Counsel: Was that puhlished in a refereed journal? 
Witness: It was a special report hy the Department of Geography. 
Counsel: Was it puhlished in a refereed journal? 
Witness: No. 
Later, the witness turns the tables and raises the same issue regarding one of 
the attorney's sources: 
Witness: Has this article been puhlished? 
Counsel: Yes, I believe so. 
Witness: Where was it puhlished? 
Counsel; It was puhlished by the Survey Research Center of the 
Institute for Social Research. . . .I don't know if it's heen 
puhlished in a refereed journal. It's a hardcover hook I have 
heen advised. 
The game continues: later the same attorney "reduces" another of this witness' 
references to a much less credible source, a graduate student's doctoral 
dissertation! 
Counsel: Was it a hook? 
Witness: It's a dissertation. 
Counsel: Was it published by a commercial or academic publisher? 
Witness: No. 
Counsel: So this is what we call a student doctoral dissertation? 
Witness : Yes. 
Attorneys also can challenge a witness' credibility in terms of their track 
record in studying the precise issue to which they are testifying. Granting the 
witness general expertise in the area of residential segregation, the attorney 
below closes in on a scholar's publication record regarding the role of schools 
in perpetuating this social process (known as the "problem of reciprocal 
effect"). 
Coun .sel: In fact, doctor, everything that I have read of yours, 
including your articles . . . at no place mentions school de 
jure segregation as a cause of racially segregated 
neighborhoods, is that a fair statement. 
Witness: I don't know whether there is some reference to it in the 
materials of the kind you mentioned about, but I have not 
studied that aspect specifically. 
Counsel: You came here to testify about it, though? 
Witness: Certainly. 
Challenges to the Witness' Knowledge of Local Issues. 
A second major strategy used by attorneys in cross-examination is to 
challenge the national scholar's general data with regard to its relevance, 
applicability and validity in the local arena. Social scientists' ability to 
generalize across individuals and local situations is central to the development 
of their discipline; this focus may make them vulnerable in a court proceeding 
concerned with local facts, violations and remedies. Thus, Gardner (1979) 
stresses the importance of this strategy for defense counsel in employment 
discrimination cases and Pettigrew (1979) reports its common use in school 
desegregation trials. As noted below by one attorney, some scholars are easy to 
cross examine hecause they lack time on-site, experience in the specific locale, 
or even detailed knowledge ahout the case and school situation at hand. 
He on the other hand, was an easy cross because he had no familiarity 
with the city. He had no familiarity with voluntary programs. He had 
no familiarit) with mandatory programs. He just came here and 
pontificated.and it wasn't too hard to deflate that. 
An example of the actual use of this strategy during cross-examination follows: 
Counsel: Can you tell us where the initial placement of a school in 
this city has influenced the initial character of the 
neig hhorhood? 
Witness: No, I can't. 
Counsel: Since you can't tell us one, then you are not telling the 
Court that the initial location of schools in this city has 
influenced the racial character of the neighborhoods? 
Witness: No. I am not adducing any specific examples about this city, 
and in particular, I would he uninformed about the initial 
placement, because most of my studies have dealt with a period 
when the city was largely built up -- had more to do with 
relocation and redesignation of the character of schools. 
Counsel: Doctor, I inquired of that because you were tendered by your 
attorney as an expert in the field of racial residential urban 
segregation, especially in this city, and that is what you do 
purport that to he your field of expertise. 
Witness: Yes. 
Another example of this approach comes from a cross-examination in which the 
witness clearly anticipates the line of attack and attempts to distinguish his 
observations ("refamiliarizing myself") from his investigations ("scholarly 
study") : 
Counsel: Your study of this school system, if I have got it correctly 
- first, your study of the plan is limited to your driving 
tour of the schools, right, on two separate occasions? 
Witness: My study of what? 
Counsel: of the plan. 
Witness: Of the school plan, yes. 
Counsel: And you didn't go in the schools? 
Witness: No sir. Not on that tour. I have personal acquaintance among 
many teachers and I must say I have conversed with some of 
them. 
Counsel: But your investigation did not include conferences for that 
purpose with any teachers or principals or administrators? 
Witness: You are speaking now of my tour? 
Counsel: Yes. 
Witness: Yes, and I think you dignify it to call it an investigation. 
I was refamiliarizing myself with the schools in this system. 
I 
Counsel: And you haven't made any study of the type of programs which 
are being advanced, taught, in each of the various schools? 
Witness: No sir. 
Counsel: Nor of the particular training which particular teachers have 
received for particular programs in their particular school? 
Witness: No sir. 
In the same testimony a similar dynamic occurs later, although on a 
different topic. The witness has just testified to the problems of teacher 
prejudice against minority youth and to the potential impact of such attitudes on 
student performance. 
Counsel: Did you talk to any teachers? You said you did not talk to 
any teachers in this city to see if this is a prevalent 
attitude? 
Witness: I said I talked fifteen minutes to one teacher. I also said I 
dr'ew no conclusion from that. I said that (prejudice) is a 
general characteristic across the nation. 
The Court: Do you think you can ask the teacher or superintendent, or 
the School Board Member, or a Doctor of Education, or a 
housewife, or a Federal Court Judge if they are prejudiced and 
they will say they are? 
Witness: It is impossihle. There is no instrument to measure that. 
Counsel: I presume a man of your qualifications who has been making 
surveys can make questions of a particular individual to get 
some indication how they feel? 
Witness: I consider the more important thing is not the attitude and 
not the perspective, but the behavior. The behavior is 
observable, it is recordable. If I were to study this city it 
would take me a year, probably, and what I would do is 
establish check sheets on the behavior of teachers: how many 
times does X teacher or teachers as an aggregate call on 
minority children, how much reinforcement, how much reward, .. 
what kind of reward? I would use some kind of interaction 
scale. I think it is a dead issue to look to prejudice. What 
I said is teachers in minority schools tend to he pessimistic 
about the ahility of their children to learn. I refer you to 
DARK GHETTO by Dr. Kenneth Clark to support what I say about 
the black population, and so forth; He has not studied this 
city either. 
Buoyed no douht by the judge's intervention and apparent sympathy (with his 
expertise if not necessarily his stance on the issues), the witness subtly 
attacks hack in his last comment: Kenneth Clark, whose testimony was a central 
part of the scientific evidence in Brown v. Board of Education, has not studied 
the city either! 
Implications of Special Interest or Personal Bias 
A third strategy of cross-examination attorneys employ is to suggest or gain 
admission that the scientist has heen compromised by his or her biases or special 
interests. Many scholars have addressed experts' problems of "ohjectivity" in 
court (Kalmuss, 1981; Kousser, 1982), and Haddad (1979), Kornhlum (1974) and 
Shuhow and Bergstresser (1977) have identified some of the specific indicators of 
hias for which attorneys should probe. For instance, personal hias may take the 
form of strongly held values on the issues in litigation or friendship with the 
attorney or party in the case. Other special interests at stake may involve 
monetary gain, publicity seeking, consistent alliance or allegiance to a 
particular party in a series of cases (plaintiff or defense) or strong 
theoretical predispositions. Attorneys senerally are rather cautious about how 
they employ this strategy. A direct approach might have them calling all experts 
"hired guns", "whores", or "party shills", but a more subtle and indirect series 
of inquiries and implicatons usually is used. 
Innuendoes that financial qain, perhaps ill-gotten at that, may be at stake, 
can be seen in this cross-examination excerpt: 
Counsel: Is there a rule in your University on consulting time? 
Witness: There is no rule in the University at the present time... 
Counsel: Your fees go directly to you and not to the University, I take 
it? 
Witness: That's true. 
Counsel: Have you been on the University payroll full time during the 
period when you have spent twenty-five working days on this 
case? 
Witness: I have. 
This kind of questioning is not unique. Frequently, the questions to plaintiff 
and defense witnesses are even more specific, probing how much experts were paid, 
how many hours or days they worked on the case, etc. 
A somewhat different approach to the problem of bias is used in the 
following cross-examination: 
Counsel: I understand that you have testified in many cases involving 
the same examination of effects of residential movements in 
desegregation cases. 
Witness: I have testified in many cases. The examination has varied 
from one to the other. 
Counsel: In any of these cases, have you testified on behalf of a hoard 
of education or other defendant wherein plaintiffs are seeking 
a desegregation order of some kind? 
Witness: I cannot give a direct answer to that, because I do not follow 
that closely the legal status of who is challenging whom at 
the particular stage in which I appear. As I mentioned in the 
deposition, I have testified for a Board of Education when it 
was seeking the desegregation remedy that I helieve was at 
stake at that particular stage of the trial. 
The full meaning of the witness' answer remains somewhat unclear; perhaps 
deliherately. It is unlikely that the witness really does not follow closely 
"the legal status of who is challenging whom". Moreover, his report of ..an 
example where he did testify for the school hoard (which was the original 
defendant in a city suit and hecame the plaintiff in a metropolitan suit) 
indicates his sophisticated understanding of hoth "the legal status" issue and 
the attorney's intent in asking the question.. This line of questioning was not 
followed further in the cross. 
Another variant of inquiry into a witness' interests is the attempt to 
discover or suggest that she has personal views, for or against desegregation, 
that might impede her ahility to act neutrally and ohjectively. Ironically, 
while taking payment for testifying is sometimes hrought up to insinuate that the 
expert is testifying for financial gain, the willingness to testify without 
renumeration is equally suspect. Experts who are willing to testify for expenses 
alone are open to the criticism that they are "true believers", and thus their 
testimony will not he neutral and ohjective. 
Search for Admissions of Legitimacy of Opposing Views. 
A fourth major strategy attorneys use in cross-examination of expert 
witnesses is to try to get them to admit that other scholars might reasonahly 
come to a different conclusion ahout a situation or data set. If such admission 
can he gained, then it is truly "one person's opinion versus another's", rather 
than one person's views representing the hulk of scientific evidence. Attorneys 
k m w  scientists have a tendency to make such admissions as. part of their 
commitment to "fairness", and usually warn their own witnesses to stick to their 
guns. AS one attorney  comment^:^ 
When you are on cross-examination, the other side is going to try to 
discredit you. So, how a person conducts himself on past 
cross-examination in one of these cases would he one of the factors we 
would look at in determining who we would want to call as an expert. 
We want somehody that isn't easily shaken from his opinion, who doesn't 
hedge and hacktrack from what he said on direct hecause of a few .. 
pointed questions hy the opposing counsel. The opposition has got to 
suggest that it is possihle that other factors are the real reason why 
something happens and not the factors you listed. And he has got to he 
ahle to say, "No, and this is why: because I have studied those other 
factors and this is why those factors are not the reason." 
Efforts to find admissions of reasonahle doubt frequently require the 
attorney to use other scholars' studies or actual testimony as a spring hoard 
(thus the use of the "learned treatise", Poythress, 1980). In the following 
example the witness first resists hut then is forced to admit legitimate 
opposition: 
Counsel: So that it's fair to say that social scientists in good faith 
differ considerahly as to what is the hest way to study data. 
Witness: I think there is some dehate ahout how to handle data. I 
think more debate comes on what the structure of the models 
are. 
Counsel: This is what I think I was getting at. Could different 
persons, using the same ,date -- could they he using different 
models and thus come up with different predictions? 
Witness: Yes. I helieve they would he using the wrong models. 
Counsel: Right, hut one could disagree on that? 
Witness: Yes. 
"Setting a Trap" for Exposures of Contradictions or Errors in Testimony 
A final strategy attorneys use to challenge or impugn the credibility of 
opposing witnesses is to discover contradictions or errors in their testimony. 
In the extreme case, an attorney plans how to "trap" a witness: 
He is very dishonest with his numbers. And you could show that, you 
could do that in this case where he manipulated numbers, manipulated 
figures to get certain results that were pre-ordained, given his biases 
and his previous finding. And you could demonstrate that in other 
cases in order to get certain conclusions he manipulated numhers. One 
way in here he would take the same numbers and do something else with 
them, so it wasn't hard to show those contradictions. . 
Since experts are themselves adept and alert, attorneys seldom can extract 
damaging testimony or admissions directly; a variety of suhtle devices more often 
are used. Sometimes an attorney who seeks .to trap a witness thinks through his 
approach carefully well ahead of time and sets up an intricate argument. At 
other times the attorney just falls into it: one question leads to another and 
sooner or later the attorney discovers how he might he able to make an effective 
challenge. In this regard Shubow and Bergstresser recommend giving some 
witnesses enough rope to "confuse and alientate everyone listening" (1977, p. 33) 
and thereby trap themselves. 
In the first few examples of this strategy we illustrate traps that are 
unsuccessful or are avoided. The reader,-who now knows that traps are being set, 
can imagine how each vignette will end before the end occurs. The first example 
of an attempted trap comes from the cross-examination of an expert whose direct 
testimony linked housing and school segregation to governmental actions. 
Counsel: Is it true that it is your opinion that racial separation in 
housing occurs regardless of the character of local laws and 
policies, and regardless of the extent of other forms of 
segregation and administration? 
Witness: Would you check the last word? Yes, that is a sentence I 
wrote many years ago to which I still agree. 
The witness recognizes that the attorney is reading to him from his own puhlished 
works. If he denies the comment, he would be contradicting his own words. In 
fact, this expert is aware of the danger this statement created and ready for the 
attempted trap. 
In a second example of a failed trap, a witness openly discussed the role of 
de jure segregation-in Northern school systems. Given the specific legal meaning 
and legal history of de jure/de facto distinction in Southern and Northern school 
systems, the attorney senses he has caught the witness in a critical error or 
legal faux pas. 
-. . 
Counsel: Oh, you have found a Northern city that does have a de jure 
segregated school system? 
Witness: By my understanding they all have it. 
Counsel: If it should he determined that all Northern cities do not 
have de jure segregated school systems, then what would your 
conclusions he ? 
Witness: Well, you are referring to determination, using the particular 
determination within a court of law. I am referring to a 
scholarly definition with respect to the kinds of impact these 
law and administrative uses affect residential patterns. I 
would not change my statement on the basis of what those Court 
determinations happen to he. This is referring to a legal 
rather than scholarly definition of the term. 
The witness' response works in this case. Subsequently the cross-examining 
attorney persists hut the witness's own attorney intervenes, and the Judge 
finally halts the interaction by indicating that the witness does carefully 
distinguish between legal and "scholarly" definitions, and that he has been clear 
enough. 
Not all traps fail. In the following example, the cross-examining attorney 
spends a good deal of time asking the witness what materials he has read, how 
much time he spent on them, etc. 
Witness: There were two huge boxes, I was a little dismayed when I sat 
down with all these documents. I did attempt to look at all 
of them hut it was quite -- it's quite ohvious that I could 
not read what appeared to me to he six thousand pages of 
housing documents. I looked at most of them and picked and 
selected, trying to get a feel for the housing documents. I 
looked at what material was available and yesterday I spent 
some time with the bin of maps. 
Counsel: How much time? 
Witness: With the maps? I looked at all of the maps because I'm 
interested in maps. 
Counsel: How many maps and how much time? 
The witness indicated he worked hard and read a lot of material - a "good 
witness". This line of question and response continues. It is not yet clear 
what the attorney's intent is: does he know where he is going or is he "fishing" 
for a vulnerahility, an opening? 
Counsel: Could you tell me what depositions you read? 
Witness: If you would like me to consult my notes, I can. Just off the 
top of my head . . . I would have to look up the names hecause 
the names were all unfamiliar to me. Would you like me to.do 
that ? 
Counsel : Yes. 
Witness: It was a suhstantial document. It was perhaps -- I'll eive it 
hy thickness. It was perhaps an half inch or three-quarters 
of an inch thick. 
Counsel: Did you read a quarter of an inch or a half inch or all of the 
inches? 
Witness: I thumhed through it. I don't think it's ever necessary to 
read every word in the volume to eet an idea of what's in it. 
If we in academics had to do that, you would never get through 
all the stuff there is to read. 
Counsel: What other documents.' 
Witness: As I said to you, I read and selected in that listing of 
housing documents, given the time constraints that I had, and 
I found many of them interesting and some of them I made a few 
notes on that I could add to my lectures. There were some 
interesting points made. 
Counsel: What did you find interesting? 
Witness: I found an interesting discussion of the puhlic housing 
policies. 
Counsel: Which aspect of the puhlic housing, the fact that it was 
segregated? 
Witness: No. I was more interested in the procedures for developing 
that and the way in which it had heen effected in this city. 
Suddenly the questioning hecomes more direct: a specific question is asked ahout 
a specific housing unit. 
Counsel: Do you recall what it was you read ahout Gaylord Homes? 
Witness: I think what I was interested in was that in some of the 
documents they indicated that the expansion -- the growth of 
the hlack residential area to the west was affected hy the 
location of Gaylord Homes, which was huilt hy a hlack 
developer on vacant land and so influenced the erowth in that 
direct ion. 
Counsel: Was that private housing? 
Witness: I helieve Gaylord Homes was puhlic housing hut I would want to 
recheck that. I thoueht initially that Gaylord Homes was a 
private development and I was corrected in a conversation 
ahout that so I would want to go back and check the document 
to he ahsolutely precise. 
Counsel: Do you know how many units of housing are involved in Gaylord 
Homes? 
Witness: No, I do not. 
Counsel: Do you know its location -- I'm sorry strike that. Do you 
know the time that it opened, and the date that it opened? 
Witness: The exact date? 
Counsel: The approximate date. 
Witness: In the twenties some time I helieve. 
Counsel: When? 
Witness: I thought it was in the twenties some time. 
Counsel: Do you know the surrounding area by race or hy zoning, what 
was around Gaylord Home site at the time it opened. 
Witness: I have not made a study of that specifically. 
Counsel: Do you know if it was adjacent, immediately adjacent to the 
hlack expansion area? 
Witness: I said I didn't make a specific study of that. 
Counsel: For your information, the Gaylord Homes housing project is the 
largest housing project in the metropolitan area. It was 
built and opened in 1953, all black. 
Witness: That's an interesting piece of misinformation then in that 
document that I copied out. I have a note here that there's a . 
comment about Gaylord Homes influencing the expansion west in 
the twenties and that it one of the housing documents. I 
would certainly like to look at that but I could be mistaken. 
As I said to you, I tried to look at as much of the housing 
information as I could, given the time, but I was writing 
rapidly and reading rapidly and errors do occur. 
The trap is sprung: the witness does not remember key pieces of information about 
the "largest housing project in the metropolitan area", and a segregated 'project 
at that. The witness tries to double back by suggesting there was 
"misinformation" in the record, talking about the work-load, and admitting he 
might have been mistaken. 
Experts' Strategic Responses 
These excerpts of cross-examination should do more than illuminate various 
strategies and challenges opposing attorneys make. They also provide some 
indication of the reasons scientists experience stress and potential conflict in 
the courtroom. They also indicate ways in which scientists try to cope with 
challenges and, in many cases, fight back. 
Attorneys generally are urged to prepare their witnesses for the courtroom 
process in general, and to coach them in how to respond to cross-examination 
(Ames, 1977; Kornblum, 1974; O'Barr, 1982; Philo and Atkinson, 1978). After all, 
scientists engaged in the struggle for truth and for control of courtroom 
testimony are not passive and dependent objects. They, too, develop procedures 
for advancing or defending their opinions and deflecting or counterattacking 
attorneys1 challenges. Their procedures are reactive for the most part, because 
initiation of challenges lies in attorneys1 hands; but experts do have ch.oices 
about how to respond. 
Several social scientists have discussed these issues in print, providing 
clear examples of their experiences and counter-strategies (Brodsky, 1977; 
Loewen, 1982; Pettigrew, 1979; Poythress, 1980; Taueber, 1979; Williams, 1957; 
Wolfgang, 1974). Included in this advice are the following suggestions for 
maximum witness effectiveness: a) be "cool" or reasonable and cooperative; b) 
direct answers are more persuasive than vague or fragmented ones; c) exaggeration 
or going outside one's own field weakens a witness1 testimony; d) extreme 
slowness in response is not convincing; e) too many qualifications of an answer 
are not good; and f) follow your own attorney's lead. Experts follow these 
general suggestions in a number of ways during cross-examination, but often 
modify them when they feel they are under attack. We identify at least six of 
these strategies used by experts to thwart or counter attorneys' attacks on their 
credibility. 
The first and most general strategy expert witnesses employ is to try and 
stay "cool", to he removed from and untouched by the battle insofar as possible. 
In this response style scholars answer all the questions posed to them as 
courteously as possible. If a challenge hurts or is about to hurt they do not 
show it. In fact, as far as their hehavior is concerned, we would not know they 
are part of a contest at all. Only their suhsequent revelations in an interview 
suggest what really went on inside. As one scholar reports on her experiences 
and responses: 
The next time I am under cross I am going to write up a card and I am 
going to put it in front of me where I can see it and it is going to 
say "stop". And any time I get a question that upsets me I'm going to 
stop and I am going to sit and I am going to wait until I have figured 
out what I am going to do, and then I am going to answer. I am not 
going to he rushed and I am going to try to keep my cool. 
Possihle examples of this strategy presented earlier include comments such as "I 
don't know", "If you give me an honest man's leeway", and "I do not follow that 
closely the legal status of who is challenging whom..." 
A second strategy experts utilize during stressful cross-examination 
involves parrying the opposing counsel's questions. For instance, the expert may 
ask the attorney to repeat' or rephrase questions that he does not want to answer 
or may want to think ahout. At the very least, such an approach stalls for time; 
at hest, the attorney may decide it is not worth while to pursue the issue. A 
related approach involves reinterpreting questions (often to oneself) and then 
answering the question one wishes to answer rather than the one that is asked. 
If the attorney asks a vague question to start with this would he an effective 
device. Even if the attorney asks a fairly direct question, this strategy 
permits the expert to make the points he wishes to make, or to avoid a direct 
response to an uncomfortahle question. In order to counter this tack the 
persistent attorney must interrupt, point out that his question has not heen 
answered, and hegin again. Possihle examples of this strategy include comments 
such as: "I do not follow the question," "I did not understand the question" and 
"I think the way to achieve school integration is through housing" (in response 
to a question ahout the desirahility of school desegregation). 
A third strategy experts use during cross-examination is to concede 
voluntarily minor errors or damaging admissions hefore they are introduced or 
emphasized hy opposing counsel. This "fair-minded" hehavior may even gain extra 
credibility points, while at the same time defusing a potentially emharassing 
contradiction or error. Examples of this strategy include comments such as: "I 
would now soften what I said", "I think you dignify it to call it an 
investigation" and "I could he mistaken". 
A fourth strategy includes ohfuscation, or the attempt to cloud a 
prohlematic question and response with jargon, circular reasoning or plain 
douhletalk. This is a dangerous strategy, since if it is exposed as such it 
could damage the credibility of the witness. However, it often is hard for 
attorneys to challenge directly or to impute such a deliherate motivation to 
normal scientific jargon. 
A fifth strategy utilized hy some experts involves counterattacking when the 
attorney appears vulnerahle. Gardner notes that expert witnesses may use this 
strategy especially if the attorney is ill-prepared, "if the witness realizes he 
is dealing with a new-student in class" (1979, p. 18). On the other hand, most 
lawyers recommend that their witnesses avoid this approach, because it does more 
than defend against attack; it opens up whole new avenues for challenge and 
response. As such, it might sacrifice the expert's long-term credihility for 
minimal and momentary gain. Nevertheless, some experts utilize this approach, 
whether deliherately or hecause they are provoked into it. Possihle examples of 
interactions leading to such comments include: "He has not studied this either", 
and "Has the article heen puhlished?...Where was it puhlished?" 
Finally, no expert is "out there" alone; the expert who rememhers the 
alliance with his or her own attorney has an extra resource to rely on when the 
going gets tough (Philo and Atkinson, 1978). For instance, several attorneys 
indicate their willingness to interrupt the cross-examination process to 
"tip-off" their witness, to a trap, to ohject to a line of questioning or to 
otherwise prevent effective challenges to their expert's testimony. The first 
example of this tactic occurs as the witness' own counsel is conducting direct 
testimony: opposing counsel attempts to mount a challenge at an early stage and 
is heaten hack. 
Counsel: Doctor, in light of what you have just read and the testimony 
you have given previously, is it fair to say that if a white 
person is considering moving in an area -- what does FHA say 
- with an incompatihle racial element, that figuring up what 
he could pay or would pay for a mortgage, FHA is suggesting 
here that he include in the cost of a private school or 
transportation to a private school or another school which is 
more compatihle racially? 
Witness: Yes. That's what this section suggests. 
Counsel: Is that the situation that prevails today as a practical 
matter? 
Witness: As a practical-- 
Opposing Counsel: (Interposing) In this community? 
Counsel: In general, is my question. 
Opposing Counsel: I helieve it would he hetter to limit it to this 
community. 
Counsel: My question is in general. If you want to ask questions, you 
wait until your turn. 
We can expect that when opposing counsel enters cross-examination this line of 
challenge will reemerge. 
Another example of attorney intervention in crossexamination occurs as 
opposing counsel is questioning a witness' relationship to the case, and whether 
he demonstrates a personal "interest" (hias) in the case. 
Opposing Counsel: I would like to estahlish a few facts with respect to 
your involvement in the events preceding this litigation. 
directed to the litigation. As I understand it, you are the 
one who decided to make a contact with counsel for the 
Plaintiffs in this action. Is that correct? 
Witness: That is not correct. 
Opposing Counsel: Would you tell us what the contact was then, or who 
made the first contact to your knowledge ... 
Counsel: I think I afi goins to ohject to this line of questioning on a 
numher of grounds. In the first place, I don't think it is 
relevant to anything. I also don't think it is proper 
cross-examination. I -do not think it goes to any of the 
issues raised on direct. 
The Court: It may and may not go to credibility. The Court fails to 
see the relevance. 
Opposing Counsel: It goes to bias. 
All these response strategies by experts are part of the hattle for control 
of testimony that occurs throughout the courtroom drama. The escalation of these 
issues during cross-examination merely highlights the underlying process of the 
adversarial system. Moreover, these experts' responses indicate that there 
really is an interaction occurring, and that experts are not simpl'y passive and 
neutral .agents acted upon by attorneys. Further, opposing counsel and expert are 
hy no means the only actors in these situations. On several occasions, as we 
have indicated, one's own counsel and the judge are active aqents, either making 
direct inquiry to the expert or curhing one another. 
Conclusions 
The interactions presented ahove indicate some of the strategies used hy 
attorneys and experts in courtroom cross-examination. The challenge to, and 
preservation of, certain roles and role behaviors involves scholars and attorneys 
in a delicate series of interaction sequences. The challenges to experts' 
testimony, often to their person and their roles, are set within the normative 
structure of courtroom adversariness. In many cases it is difficult for experts 
experiencing such challenges to present the kinds of testimony they wish to 
present, in the manner in which they wish to present it. It certainly is 
difficult for scholars to exercise the same control over their presentations in 
court as they do in the classroom or in puhlications. 
The adversarial structure of courtroom litigation is reflected in an 
underlying contest between plaintiff and defense parties. As plaintiff and 
defense attorneys try to present and interpret social reality in ways that make 
the best case for their side, experts appearing on behalf of those parties are 
inevitably drawn into the adversarial contest. Then the contest for experts' 
resources, and for interpretations of their offerings, involves them directly. 
Cross examination ,procedures represent the clearest, hut hy no means sole, 
example of the .dilemmas faced hy social scientists in the adversarial arena of 
the courtroom. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. We have edited the court transcripts in order to guarantee anonymity to 
lawyers and scholars involved, at least insofar as possible, and to shorten some 
examples. 
2. Our examples of "strategies" reflect inferences we make from observations of 
an interaction. We can not seriously imply or impute deliherate intent to any 
specific attorney or scholar in this regard. To a considerable extent, however, 
the general inferences we make about lawyers' and experts' strategies in 
cross-examination are supported by the interviews. 
3 -  This ,lawyer is asking for a witness who will not use too many hedges, will 
not hesitate over every conclusion and will be assertive in presenting testimony. 
O'Barr (1982) defines this as "powerful" speech, and. presents data to suggest 
that experimental jurors rate such 'witnesses higher than witnesses using 
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